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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-five years after the implementation of the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (“the WTO Agreement”),1 international trade
law and practice under the multilateral trading system
(MTS) of the WTO are undergoing a fundamental transition.
The “development deficits” in WTO legal disciplines, which
necessitated the Doha Round, have not been bridged for over
two decades.2 The Doha Round, which was launched in 2001
to promote development agenda, became the longest
peacetime multilateral negotiation without successful
conclusion.3 The proliferation of regional trade agreements
(RTAs) has created regulatory fragmentation and weakened
the MTS based on the principle of non-discrimination (the
“most favored nation” or the “MFN” principle).4 Recent trade
restrictive measures, such as the tariffs adopted by the
United States under the pretext of protecting national
security, have set a new pattern of trade protectionism.5
This transition marks a new era for the world trading
system post neoliberalism. WTO legal disciplines (or “WTO
disciplines”) embody neoliberalism6 in their objectives and

1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. This agreement
settled the multilateral legal frameworks for international trade.
2. See Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading
System 270–71 (2d ed. 2016).
3. Id.
4. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
5. See Yong-Shik Lee, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum
of the U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 481 (2019)
(discussing the U.S. tariffs).
6. Neoliberalism is a dominant political-economic ideology that emerged in
the 1980s, which discouraged positive government interventions in the economy
and promoted free market approaches, including privatization and trade
liberalization. Neoliberalism is based on the “Washington Consensus,” which
refers to a set of policies representing the lowest common denominator of policy
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substantive provisions.7 The Uruguay Round (1986–1994),
which was the last trade negotiation round of the GATT (the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that established
the WTO, adopted neoliberal policy prescriptions and aimed
to achieve trade liberalization across the board and the
expansion of the MTS.8 The reinforced WTO disciplines, such
as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“the Subsidies Agreement” or “the SCM Agreement”),9 the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“the
TRIMs Agreement”),10 and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, have weakened state control and influence over
trade, pursuant to the neoliberal stance. At the same time,
the old GATT provisions that enabled governments to adopt
trade-related measures to meet public interest, such as the
promotion of economic development11 (under Article XVIII),
advice being advanced by Washington-based institutions, such as fiscal
discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward areas offering
both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution
(such as primary healthcare, primary education, and infrastructure), tax reform
to lower marginal rates and broadening the tax base, interest rate liberalization,
a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry
and exit), and protection of property rights. John Williamson, What Washington
Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS
HAPPENED 5, 7–20 (John Williamson ed., 1989).
7. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. The government failures to
make economic adjustments in the 1970s during the periods of the oil shock and
the fall of the Soviet bloc and its socialist economy in the 1980s renewed the
public confidence in the market and caused the policy shift toward neoliberalism.
See supra note 6 (explaining the neoliberal policy prescriptions).
8. For a discussion of the negotiation history, see generally THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed.,
1993).
9. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
11. Economic development refers to the process of progressive transformation
of an economy leading to higher productivity and increases in income for the
majority of populations.
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were neither elaborated nor reinforced by subsequent
agreement in WTO disciplines.12
The support and confidence in neoliberalism has waned
since the 1990s, shortly after the establishment of the WTO.
The neoliberal policies in Eastern Europe (in the post-Soviet
era), Latin America, Asia, and Africa failed to deliver the
promised economic outcomes, leading to hyperinflation,
massive unemployment, and a long period of economic
recession.13 Critics have cited institutional weaknesses and
lack of proper moderation and policy sequencing as a cause
of the failure.14 Opponents of the neoliberal policy have also
criticized trade liberalization under the new trade regime of
the WTO for having concentrated economic benefits in small
privileged groups, failing to lift the living standards for the
majority of populations in developing countries.15 The
reinforced WTO disciplines have also deprived the state of its
ability to adopt key trade measures to promote economic
development, such as trade-related subsidies and tariff
measures, which were adopted by the successful developing
countries as listed below.16
12. In contrast, the fourteen separate agreements under the WTO Agreement
reinforce and elaborate the GATT provisions in other areas such as rules
regulating trade-related subsidies (the SCM Agreement). For a further
discussion, see LEE, supra note 2, at 271.
13. David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1, 6 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (citing the failures of the neoliberal policies);
see also YONG-SHIK LEE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21–22
(2019).
14. Trubek & Santos, supra note 13, at 6.
15. Id.; see also A. G. Hopkins, The New Economic History of Africa, 50 J.
AFRICAN HISTORY 155 (2009). The dichotomy between developed and developing
countries is not always clear, but the former are normally understood as highincome countries with advanced economic, technological, and industrial
capacities. In the WTO, the developing country status is self-declared without
clear definitions or guidelines by the WTO. See Who are the developing countries
in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/
d1who_e.htm [https://perma.cc/SG9N-YKTG].
16. LEE, supra note 2, at 14–32.

418

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

The successful developing countries in the 1960s through
the 1990s, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
more recently China, adopted strong government-led
development policies. These included trade-related subsidies
such as export subsidies (i.e., subsidies contingent upon
export) and import-substitution subsidies (i.e., subsidies
contingent upon the use of domestic products), as well as
tariff measures, which would not be permitted under the
current WTO disciplines.17 Like the East Asian countries,
developed countries in the West such as the United States
and the United Kingdom also employed extensive subsidies
and tariff measures during the periods of their own
development, which would have been inconsistent with the
WTO disciplines today.18 The neoliberal policy requirements
adopted under the WTO law have substantially reduced the
policy space and increased regulatory barriers to the
countries that attempt to adopt trade-related measures, as
the successful developing countries did in the past, for the
purpose of economic development.19
Ironically, a major challenge to the MTS under the
auspices of the WTO has recently been raised by its very
architect, the United States of America. The United States
was the founding member of the GATT and a major force
behind the establishment of the WTO.20 Until recently, the
17. Id; see also Mari Pangestu, Industrial Policy and Developing Countries, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 153, Table 17.1 (Bernard
Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, & Philip English eds., 2002) (discussing the evolution
of industrial policies of the successful developing countries).
18. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in
Historical Perspective 13–68 (2002).
19. Dani Rodrik commented that the current trade rules have made “a
significant dent in the abilities of developing countries to employ intelligentlydesigned industrial policies.” Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First
Century 34–35 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov., Harvard U., Faculty Research
Working Papers, RWP04–047, 2004), https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/
Research/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6UE9SZP].
20. Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, The World Trade Organization (WTO): U.S.
Participation at Risk?, CRS INSIGHT (July 18, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
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United States had initiated and promoted international
negotiations for further trade liberalization, such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement.21 The Trump
administration made a radical policy shift toward trade
protectionism, evidenced by withdrawing from the TPP
Agreement and demanding renegotiation of the North
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and amendment of
the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement on threat of their
terminations. It also imposed substantial tariffs on imports
from China22 in hundreds of product categories and invoked
national security to impose tariffs on its steel and aluminum
imports globally, excepting only a small group of countries
with which it concluded quota agreements.23 This U.S policy
departs substantially from its own traditional trade practice
favoring multilateralism and open engagement.
The radical policy shift, which has important
ramifications for the MTS requires further consideration.
The election of Donald Trump, a controversial businessman
and a political outsider, as the forty-fifth U.S. president was
an unexpected outcome.24 His support base included
economically-depressed regions in the United States25 that
IN10945.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSG5-QJFQ].
21. Yong-Shik Lee, Future of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Just a
Dead Trade Initiative or a Meaningful Model for the North-South Economic and
Trade Integration?, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 1–2 (2017).
22. See Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 47,974, 47,975 (Sep. 21, 2018).
23. These countries include South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina. For a further
discussion, see Yong-Shik Lee, The Steel and Aluminum Quota Agreements: A
Question of Compatibility with WTO Disciplines and Their Impact on the World
Trading System, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2019).
24. See John Slides, A Comprehensive Average of Election Forecasts Points to
a Decisive Clinton Victory, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/08/a-comprehensive-average-of-election
-forecasts-points-to-a-decisive-clinton-victory/ [https://perma.cc/LEH8-LYHB];
see also Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Economic Development in the United States:
Toward a New Paradigm, 68 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 229, 230 (2019).
25. For example, President Trump won the majority vote in a number of
states that make up the Great Lakes megaregion, commonly referred to as “Rust
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did not perceive benefits from the trade liberalization policy
that the United States had pursued under the previous
administrations. The multinational enterprises based in the
East and the West coasts of the United States, new leading
industries, such as pharmaceuticals and IT, and
international investors and traders may have reaped the
benefits from the policy, but the residents in the areas with
the declining industries losing out from the competition with
imports have supported the trade protectionism advocated
by Trump.26 The elements of neoliberalism in the WTO
system, which caused the “development deficits” in WTO
disciplines, ironically provoked the trade protectionism from
the largest and the most powerful economy, even if the
protectionist trade policy of the Trump administration is
unlikely to revive the declining U.S. industries and generate
more employment and income for his supporters.27
This Article, which examines international trade law
and practice post neoliberalism, is organized as follows. Part
I discusses the development deficits of the WTO system,
examines the challenges from developing countries through
coalitions and alliances, and analyzes the current impasse of
the Doha Round. Part II examines the proliferation of
bilateralism and regionalism in international trade, which
creates preferential/discriminatory trade arrangements,
causes the fragmentation of trade disciplines, and weakens
the MTS. Part III discusses the trade protectionism of the
Belt.” This area encompasses the upper Midwest states, stretching from northern
Minnesota to western New York and Pennsylvania. The term signifies the
economic decline, deindustrialization, population loss, and urban decay caused
by the decline of its once-prosperous manufacturing sector. This region has lost
more than 1.2 million manufacturing jobs since 1990 and 2.2 million since 1970.
Robert D. Yaro, Toward a National Reinvestment Strategy for Underperforming
Regions, in AMERICA 2050: NEW STRATEGIES FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 13 (Petra Todorovich & Yoav Hagler eds., 2009).
26. See Trip Gabriel, How Erie Went Red: The Economy Sank, and Trump
Rose, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2016.
27. It is because the primary cause of the declining U.S. industries is the
failure of industrial adjustment through innovation, re-education, and training,
rather than trade. See Lee, supra note 24, at 230–31.
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United States under the Trump administration, as
demonstrated by its recent trade measures adopted under
the pretext of the national security protection. Trade
protectionism of the most powerful economy and trader
affects the stability of the MTS and undermines its viability.
Part IV suggests possible regulatory reforms to address some
of the identified problems in the current trade disciplines.
Part V draws conclusions.
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I. CHALLENGES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A. Development Deficits
1. An Unbalanced Deal
The Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations aimed at
increasing market access. Efforts to increase market access
had continued throughout the preceding GATT regime, and
tariffs have been systematically reduced since its beginning
in 1947. Several multilateral trade negotiations had been
convened for the purpose of tariff reductions, and as a result
the average tariff rates of industrial countries on industrial
products dropped from around 44 percent28 in the beginning
of the GATT era to 3.9 percent at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round.29 In this process, developing countries made
considerable import concessions, particularly during the UR.
For instance, India offered an average tariff reduction of 6.16
percent, while it only received an average reduction of 1.22
percent for its exports.30 Similarly, Thailand offered 5.93
percent and received only 1.46 percent on average.31 These
concessions by developing countries were significant,
although developing countries had imposed higher tariff
rates than developed countries.
In contrast, developed countries did not offer comparable
concessions in market access, particularly in the product
28. There is an argument that the pre-GATT average tariff rates were lower,
at around 22 percent. Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting
Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21782, 2015).
29. There were eight multilateral trade negotiations (“rounds”) during the
GATT era (1947–1994). The first round (the “Doha Round”) in the WTO regime
began in November 2001. During the previous GATT rounds, tariffs were reduced
by an average of 35 percent at each round. As a result, the tariff rates of nonprimary products of industrial countries fell to a mere 3.9 percent after the
Uruguay Round in 1994. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 74 (2d
ed. 1997).
30. J. Michael Finger & A. Alan Winters, Reciprocity in the WTO, in
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 57 T. 7.3.
31. Id.
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areas in which developing countries would have a relative
advantage in exports such as agriculture and textile.32 In
agriculture, trade was not fully liberalized. Measures that
were not allowed for trade in industrial products, such as
export subsidies, were maintained albeit subject to certain
reduction commitments.33 In textiles and clothing trade,
extensive import restrictions, such as restrictive quotas and
high tariffs, had been prevalent, as represented by the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).34 The Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was settled during the UR, but
it was an interim agreement which maintained the status
quo.35 It took ten additional years before textile and clothing
trading was fully integrated with the MTS without trade
restrictions such as the MFA.36
On the whole, the UR resulted in an unbalanced deal
between developed and developing countries. The UR
achieved a substantial degree of trade liberalization for trade
in industrial projects for which developed countries enjoy a
competitive advantage. However, trade liberalization was
limited in product areas such as agricultural products,
textile, and clothing, in which developing countries would
have a competitive advantage, as discussed above. The new
rules such as the SCM Agreement created difficulty for
developing countries to promote industrial development. The
SCM Agreement restricted policy space for developing
countries by preventing them from adopting certain traderelated subsidies to promote domestic industries and
economic development, such as export subsidies and import-

32. LEE, supra note 2, at 141–42.
33. Agreement on Agriculture arts. 8–9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. The
Agreement also stipulates domestic support reduction commitments, as
expressed in “Total Aggregated Measurement of Support” (AMS). Id. art. 6.
34. LEE, supra note 2, at 143.
35. Id. at 144.
36. Id.
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substitution subsidies.37 Successful developing countries had
adopted these subsidies successfully for their own economic
development.38 The UR also concluded preferential rules for
developing countries, often referred to as “special and
differential treatment” or “S&D treatment,” but they were
inadequate to balance the outcome as further discussed
below.
2. Inadequate “Special and Differential” Treatment
WTO legal disciplines include preferential provisions for
developing countries granting S&D treatment. These
provisions aim to: (i) increase the trade opportunities of
developing countries, (ii) require WTO Members
(“Members”) to safeguard the interests of developing
countries, (iii) allow some flexibility to developing countries
with respect to commitments and use of policy instruments,
(iv) provide additional transitional time-periods to
implement commitments, and (v) offer technical assistance.39
According to a WTO report, 139 S&D provisions are
scattered throughout the WTO disciplines.40
However, these S&D provisions are inadequate to meet
the development interests of developing countries. The S&D
provisions disregard significant differences existing among
developing countries in economic and trade capacities and
treat them without a distinction, with the sole exception of
least-developed countries. The S&D provisions are
temporary in nature,41 insufficient in the extent of

37. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3. Annex I of the SCM Agreement
includes the illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies. Id. Annex I.
38. LEE, supra note 2, at 14–32.
39. WTO Secretariat, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO
Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/196 (June 14, 2013).
40. Id.
41. For example, developing countries (those other than least-developed
countries) were permitted to apply export subsidies for a period of eight years
from the implementation date of the WTO Agreement. SCM Agreement, supra
note 9, art. 27, para. 2(a).
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preference,42 or impose regulatory impediment on developing
countries seeking to benefit from the S&D treatment. The
regulatory impediment necessitates further examination.
For an example, Article XVIII of the GATT,43 entitled
“Government Assistance to Economic Development,” is a
primary GATT provision offering development facilitation.
Article XVIII enables developing-country Members, whose
economies can only support low standards of living and are
in the early stages of development,44 “to maintain sufficient
flexibility in their tariff structure [e.g., may increase tariff
rates] to be able to grant the tariff protection required for the
establishment of a particular industry and to apply
quantitative restrictions for balance of payment purposes in
a manner which takes full account of the continued high level
of demand for imports likely to be generated by their
programmes of economic development.”45
Article XVIII is designed to assist developing-country
Members in implementing programs and policies of economic
development to raise the standard of living for their
populations. It does so by authorizing measures affecting
imports, such as raising tariffs beyond their multilateral

42. For example, safeguard measures, emergency import restraint measures
adopted under the Agreement on Safeguards, must not be applied against a
product originating in a developing country Member as long as its share of
imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does not exceed 3
percent, provided that those developing country Members with less than 3
percent import share collectively account for not more than 9 percent of total
imports of the product concerned. Agreement on Safeguards art. 9.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter SA]. The 3 and 9 percent ceilings are criticized
for being too restrictive. YONG-SHIK LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE
174 n.31 (3d ed. 2014).
43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The provisions of the 1947 GATT
are incorporated by reference in the GATT 1994. They are incorporated as a part
of the WTO legal disciplines as a result of the UR. See GATT 1994, supra note 4
(incorporating the GATT in the WTO legal disciplines).
44. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 4(a).
45. Id. art. XVIII, para. 2 (explanation and emphasis added).
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commitments under the WTO disciplines.46 However, the
Article also requires the Member proposing to adopt the
measure to conduct negotiations with the other Members to
be affected by the measures and offer adequate
compensation, lack of which will entitle the affected
Members to withdraw or modify their own trade
concessions.47 Such negotiation may take a considerable
amount of time. In addition, developing countries facing
resource constraints may not be able to offer adequate
compensation. These requirements render Article XVIII
measures costly and risky from the perspective of developing
countries in need of the measures.48 The UR did not remedy
the insufficient Article XVIII provisions by, for example,
creating a more effective agreement, as it did in a number of
other areas,49 that would be more feasible for developing
countries to invoke without the burden of time-consuming
negotiations, costly compensation, and the risk of
retaliation.50

46. See LEE, supra note 2, at 72–77.
47. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 7.
48. See LEE, supra note 2, at 273. As a result, relatively few Article XVIII
measures were adopted. From 1947 to 1994, Section A of Article XVIII (which
provides for measures other than for balance-of-payment reasons) was invoked
only nine times: by Benelux on behalf of Suriname (1958), Greece (1956, 1965),
Indonesia (1983), Korea (1958), and Sri Lanka, twice in 1955 and once each in
1956 and 1957, and has not been invoked since the establishment of the WTO.
WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT 501 (1995) [hereinafter
ANALYTICAL INDEX].
49. For example, Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
and Agreement on Safeguards were concluded to enable Members to adopt
measures to protect intellectual property rights and safeguard measures,
formerly applied under GATT Article XX and XIX, respectively, more effectively
under clearer conditions. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; SA, supra note 42.
50. See LEE, supra note 2, at 271.
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3. Harmful Trade Remedy Measures
WTO disciplines authorize trade remedy measures or
“administered protection,” such as anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures, and safeguard measures. Antidumping measures are applied in the form of increased
tariffs when imports are “dumped,” i.e., sold at prices below
normal value.51 Countervailing measures, also in the form of
increased tariffs, are applied against imports where the
government of the exporting country provided either
“prohibited subsidies” or other “actionable subsidies.”52
Safeguard measures are applied in the form of increased
tariffs or quantitative restrictions (quotas) against imports
where an increase in imports causes serious injury to a
domestic industry or threat thereof.53
Among administrative protections, anti-dumping
measures and countervailing measures are particularly
adverse to the development interests of developing countries.
Anti-dumping measures are the most prevalent trade
remedy measures. As of June 2018, 1,854 anti-dumping
measures were in force.54 Developing countries are
particularly vulnerable to anti-dumping measures, because
they tend to rely on low-cost labor and price competitiveness
for their exports, and anti-dumping measures tend to target
low-priced products exported from developing countries.55

51. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 1, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter “AntiDumping Practice Agreement” or “ADP Agreement”]. The “normal value” is
determined by comparison to the home price or, where a proper comparison
cannot be made due to the market situation or a low sales volume in the domestic
market, to an export price in a third country. Id. arts. 1–2.
52. These categories include export subsidies, import-substitution subsidies,
or any other subsidies that adversely affect the trade of other Members. SCM
Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 7–9.
53. SA, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 1.
54. World Trade Organization, Report (2018) of the Committee on AntiDumping Practices, Annex C, WTO Doc. G/L/1270, G/ADP/25 (Oct. 29, 2018).
55. See LEE, supra note 2, at 124.
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Anti-dumping measures are premised on the presumption
that there is somehow a “normal price” that can be
determined by the investigating authorities, rather than by
the market. Yale economist T. N. Srinivasan characterized
anti-dumping as the equivalent of a “nuclear weapon in the
armory of trade policy” and suggested removing it in the 1999
WTO high-level symposium on Trade and Development.56
Countervailing measures are also adverse to the
development interests of developing countries. As mentioned
earlier, the successful developing countries in East Asia and
in the West adopted subsidies to promote domestic
industries.57 This policy tool is no longer authorized under
WTO disciplines where it affects trade. Countervailing
measures are applicable against prohibited subsidies such as
export subsidies, import-substitution subsidies, and
otherwise actionable subsidies.58 Exports are an import
vehicle to promote economic development where domestic
markets are small. Government subsidies contingent upon
exports (export subsidies) can contribute to export expansion
as demonstrated by the successful development cases in East
Asia.59 Likewise, subsidies contingent upon the use of
domestic products (import-substitution subsidies) can also
contribute to industrial development in the early stages of
economic development, even if liberal market economists
tend to object to the use of both types of subsidies as
economically inefficient.60 Regardless of the debate, the
policy choice—currently limited by the SCM Agreement—
should be available to developing countries under qualifying

56. WTO, Report on the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and
Development (Mar. 17–18, 1999), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/
summhl_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2XE-P6RE].
57. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 50 (for a discussion of the adoption of
subsidies for the purpose of economic development).
58. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 7–9.
59. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 46–51; LEE, supra note 2, at 98.
60. LEE, supra note 2, at 19–32.
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conditions,61 in consideration of its important role for
economic development that is also recognized by the SCM
Agreement.62
B. Coalitions of Developing Countries
1. Developing Countries in Coalitions
The development deficits inherent in the WTO, as
discussed in the preceding Section, brewed discontent among
developing countries. They felt that the outcome of the UR
was unbalanced and did not serve their interests
adequately.63 In contrast to this development, some
developed countries encouraged by the outcome of the UR
pushed for the inclusion of additional developed-country
agendas, such as labor standards and environmental
conditions.64 This push was met with strong objections by
developing countries.65 The WTO’s pursuit of global
harmonization of an extensive range of national rules caused
considerable strain among Members and clashes with local
interests seeking policy autonomy.66 Discontent and tension
grew significantly by the late 1990s, contributing to the
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and the
Cancún Ministerial in 2003.67
61. See discussion of the Tariff-Facilitating Subsidy infra Section IV.A.
62. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27, para. 1 (“Members recognize that
subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of
developing country Members.”).
63. LEE, supra note 2, at 282; see also Declaration by the Group of 77 and
China on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar (Oct. 22, 2001),
https://www.g77.org/doc/Doha.htm [https://perma.cc/3DZ2-MZS3].
64. John S. Odell, The Seattle Impasse and Its Implications for the World
Trade Organization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 400, 403 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James
D. Southwick eds., 2002).
65. Id. at 400–03.
66. Id.
67. See also Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 219, 219 (2004).
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Developing countries formed the numerical majority in
the WTO, and they found a means to challenge major
developed-country Members by forming alliances and
coalitions.68 Efforts to form developing country coalitions
(the “South-South coalitions”) against the hegemonic
developed countries to safeguard their economic and political
interests had begun since the historic Bandung AsianAfrican Conference in 1955.69 The Group of 77, formed within
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in June 1964, became the most important
structure for the South–South coalition and promoted
reforms in the GATT.70 The coalition was not active during
the UR but revived through the establishment of the South
Center in 1994 and the subsequent Havana Meeting in
2000.71
The Group of 77 was a loose organization, and it did not
represent the only coalition among developing countries.
Developing countries through multiple alliances and
coalitions demanded changes necessary to restore a balance
in WTO disciplines and reduce the development deficits. For
example, twenty developing countries led by Brazil, India,
and China (which later became the G21) formulated a
common position on negotiations and submitted a joint

68. See Faizel Ismail, One Year Since the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial
Conference: Developing Countries Re-claim the Development Content of the
WTO Doha Round, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A
DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE 121, 139 (Yong-Shik Lee ed., 2008); An Chen, A
Reflection on the South–South Coalition in the Last Half-Century from the
Perspective of International Economic Law-Making, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 33, 35.
69. Chen, supra note 68, at 35–36.
70. Id. at 36–37. From 1964 to 1968, the Group of 77 strongly advocated and
instituted reformative guidelines and jurisprudential principles, inter alia, on
generalized preferential and non-reciprocal treatment favorable to the
developing countries and promoting the partial reform of the GATT legal system.
Additionally, the Group of 77 was instrumental to adopting both the U.N.
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974. Id.
71. Id. at 38–39.
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proposal on global trade reform to the WTO72 days before the
convening of the Cancún Ministerial Conference. The
proposal included increasing market access for agricultural
products and reducing agricultural subsidies.73 By the turn
of the century, the challenges from developing countries
formed a key dynamic in WTO negotiations, which meant
that no progress in the MTS would be possible unless their
development interests were accommodated.
2. Prospects of the South-South Coalitions
In addition to the Group of 77, various other coalitions
and alliances emerged over the course of WTO negotiations,
such as the G21; the alliance among CARICOM, the OAU
and the least-developed countries (LDCs); and the G33.74 As
discussed in the following Section, the stalemate in the Doha
Round continued for well over a decade without an end in
sight. Developing countries in alliances and coalitions may
have been successful in tabling their development agenda for
the MTS but have not yet been so successful in reforming the
WTO to meet their development interests. Factors such as
the large economic and political gaps existing among
developing countries, the divergent and at times conflicting
interests among developing countries on specific
development issues (e.g. the agricultural issues), and the
influence of the North and their strategies have imposed a
degree of limitations on the South-South coalitions.
Developing countries comprise three-quarters of the
WTO membership. They are a large group of extremely
divergent countries in economic capacities, trade interests,
cultural and political backgrounds. For example, China,
which is still considered a developing country in terms of its

72. World Trade Organization, Agriculture – Framework Proposal, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(03)/W/6 (Sept. 4, 2003).
73. Id.
74. Chen, supra note 68, at 43 n.23.
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per capita income,75 is the second largest economy in the
world and the largest exporter, with significant political
influence. Other “giant” developing countries such as India
and Brazil are also very different in economic and trade
capacities and political influence from most other developing
countries. This extreme divergence is not conducive to
maintaining strong and united coalitions over time, despite
the claimed solidarity among the members. Conflicts among
developing countries also reduce confidence and allegiance in
the South-South coalitions. Large developing countries, such
as China, may criticize the hegemonic attitude of the Global
North, but they have also exerted their own powers and
hegemony in their sphere of influence. This is demonstrated
by China’s trade retaliation against its smaller trade
partners, including South Korea, Vietnam, and the
Philippines, over geopolitical issues such as the deployment
of a missile defense system that it found objectionable.76
Additionally, developing countries have not shared
common interests on some key trade issues, such as
agricultural issues. Some developing countries have strong
export interests, but some do not. Consequently, they have
shown different attitudes toward the proposed agricultural
reform in the WTO.77 The powerful North exerted their
influence on members of the coalitions. Its strategy,
including the bilateral approach made by the United States
to negotiate and conclude bilateral and regional trade
agreements with individual developing countries,78 has
75. China’s per capita GNI (gross national income) was US $9,460 in 2018,
below the world average of US $11,124 in the same year. GNI per capita, Atlas
method (current US$), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/6H8G-2KU2].
76. For a relevant discussion, see Yong-Shik Lee, Should China be Granted
Market Economy Status?: In View of Recent Development, 3 CHINA & WTO REV.
319, 327–35 (2017).
77. For example, the majority of the Group of 77 did not join the 2003
Framework Proposal. See Agriculture – Framework Proposal, supra note 72.
78. See Ian F. Ferguson, Cong. Research Serv., RL32060, World Trade
Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda 2, 8 (2006); Joseph

2020]

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

433

weakened the coalitions. The South-South coalitions are
expected to continue, but the emergence of a strong, united
coalition that represents the majority of developing countries
is unlikely to appear in the near future. Rather, coalitions
are more likely to remain as loose groups, and smaller ones
such as the G21 will act to advance the common interests of
a limited number of developing countries. Regardless of the
coalitions, large developing countries such as China, India,
and Brazil will continue to play a key role in the MTS on its
own economic capacity and political influence, advancing
their own agenda that at times could meet the interests of
other developing countries as well as their own.
C. The Doha Round and Its Impasse
1. The Launch of the Doha Round
The WTO’s first trade negotiation round, “the Doha
Round,” was launched in 2001 in Doha, Qatar at the fourth
Ministerial Conference.79 The focus of the Doha Round was
the improvement of the conditions of trade for developing
countries, as demonstrated by the establishment of a work
program entitled the “Doha Development Agenda (DDA).”80
The Doha Round (or “the Doha Development Round” for its
emphasis on the development issues) arose out of the
challenges from developing countries against the
development deficits in the WTO. The shift in negotiating
powers in favor of developing countries since the failed 1999
Seattle Ministerial meant that it was necessary to address

Stiglitz, Arrested Development, The Guardian (Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.thegua
rdian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/post290 [https://perma.cc/Q3D5-HPJK].
79. For relevant documents on the Doha Round, see World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. See also WORLD
TRADE ORG., THE DOHA ROUND TEXTS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2009)
[hereinafter DOHA TEXTS].
80. Doha Declaration, supra note 79, para. 2; DOHA TEXTS, supra note 79, at
5.
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development issues for the MTS to progress in the new WTO
system.81
The Doha Round included a long list of ambitious
objectives: implementation, agriculture, services, market
access (non-agriculture), intellectual property, investment,
competition, transparency in government procurement,
trade facilitation, anti-dumping, subsidies, regional
agreements, dispute settlement, environment, e-commerce,
small economies, debt and finance, trade and technology
transfer, technical cooperation, least-developed countries,
and special and differential treatment.82 Members were
expected to maintain the single undertaking and accept the
entire package on the outcome of the negotiations, 83 which
later proved to cause substantial delays in the conclusion of
the Doha Round.
Of the number of subjects to be negotiated, agriculture
was the most important. The agriculture section in the DDA
included “substantial improvements in market access;
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support,” while maintaining special and
differential treatment for developing countries.84 Under the
terms of the Agreement on Agriculture, work for the
negotiation had already been underway.85 The DDA,
however, did not include deeper regulatory reform that
would re-balance the WTO disciplines to meet the
development interests of developing countries, such as
reformation of the subsidies regime to allow export and
import-substitution subsidies for qualified developing
countries,86 adjustment of the binding tariff concessions (i.e.,
81. LEE, supra note 2, at 282–83.
82. Doha Declaration, supra note 79.
83. Id. para. 47.
84. Id. para 13.
85. Id.
86. See discussion on the DFS infra Section IV.A.
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clarification and reinforcement of Article XVIII measures),87
and substantial adjustment of anti-dumping measures
toward its removal.88
2. The Long and Winding Road: A Long Impasse
The Doha Round was originally scheduled to conclude by
January 2005.89 However, the failure of the first post-Doha
Ministerial (the 2003 Cancún Ministerial) due to
disagreements over agricultural issues and a standstill over
a group of other issues (“Singapore Issues”)90 signaled its
treacherous path. The Singapore issues included four
subjects: trade and investment, competition policy,
transparency in government procurement, and trade
facilitation.91 Members agreed at the 1996 Singapore
Ministerial Conference to establish working groups for
further investigation.92 The DDA initially included these
developed-country issues, but lack of consensus on the part
of developing countries caused the removal of three of them
from further negotiation.93 Accordingly, Members agreed to
proceed only on the subject of trade facilitation, 94 which led
to the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation
later in the process.
Members failed to meet the negotiation deadlines
repeatedly which had to be extended each time. Further,

87. See discussion on the DFT infra Section IV.A.
88. Id. For a reform proposal, see discussion infra Section IV.A. See also LEE,
supra note 2, at 290–98.
89. Doha Declaration, supra note 79, para. 45.
90. See Robert Baldwin, Failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at
Cancún: Reasons and Remedies, 29 WORLD ECON. 677, 689 (2006) (discussing the
causes of the failure).
91. Id.
92. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, paras. 20-22 (1996).
93. World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council,
para. 1(g), WTO Doc. WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
94. Id.
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Members could not agree on the three key issues (“the
triangle of issues”): agricultural domestic support,
agricultural market access, and non-agricultural market
access (NAMA).95 Director-General of the WTO at the time,
Pascal Lamy, described the impasse: “the gap in level of
ambition between market access and domestic support
remained too wide to bridge. This blockage was such that the
discussion did not even move on to the third leg of the
triangle—market access in NAMA.”96 The strong political
interests associated with agricultural domestic support in
the United States and the EU limited their options and
created a substantial difficulty in making any breakthrough
on these issues.97 A number of Members also diverted their
attention and resources to bilateral and regional trade deals,
which further weakened focus on the Doha negotiations.98
Despite the impasse, visible outcomes were produced in
the 2013 Bali Ministerial and the subsequent 2015 Nairobi
Ministerial in the form of Ministerial Decisions. These
include the Agreement on Trade Facilitation,99 facilitating
food security in developing countries,100 special safeguard
mechanism for developing countries,101 cotton trade
(prohibiting export subsidies and calling for a further

95. Chairman’s Introductory Remarks, Informal TNC meeting at the level of
Head of Delegation, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 27, 2006), https://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_28march06_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BLP5
-422D].
96. Id.
97. See Daniella Markheim & Brian Riedl, Farm Subsidies, Free Trade, and
the Doha Round, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 5, 2007), https://www.heritage
.org/budget-and-spending/report/farm-subsidies-free-trade-and-the-doha-round
[https://perma.cc/DR94-V56M].
98. LEE, supra note 2, at 286.
99. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade Facilitation – Ministerial
Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/36, WT/L/911 (2013).
100. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/44, WT/L/979 (2015).
101. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/43, WT/L/978 (2015).
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reduction in domestic support and improvements to market
access for LDCs),102 preferential rules of origin for LDCs,103
and extension of trade preference for LDC trade in
services.104 Most importantly, a decision was issued to
eliminate all export subsidies in agriculture.105 Under this
Decision, developed-country Members were required to
eliminate their remaining scheduled export subsidy
entitlements as of the date of adoption of the Decision, while
developing-country Members were required to eliminate
such entitlements by the end of 2018.106
The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial did not formally declare
the end of the Doha Round, but Members disagreed on the
continuation of negotiation on the Doha mandate.107 For the
latter reason, some called the Doha Round effectively
ended.108 Members, however, remained committed to
continuing negotiations on the remaining Doha issues.109
Regardless of the formal announcement, the momentum to
revive the Doha Round seems to have been lost, and as shown
by the outcome of the subsequent Buenos Aires Ministerial

102. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/46, WT/L/981 (2015).
103. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/47, WT/L/917/Add.1 (2015).
104. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/48, WT/L/982 (2015).
105. World Trade Organization, Export Competition – Ministerial Decision of
19 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/980 (2015) [hereinafter Export
Competition Declaration].
106. Id. paras. 6–7.
107. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December, 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (2015).
108. The Editorial Board, Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/globaltrade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html [https://perma.cc/WF4Q-Y2EP];
The FT View, The Doha round finally dies a merciful death, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/9cb1ab9e-a7e2-11e5-955c-1e1d6de
94879 [https://perma.cc/Y7KT-TJTA].
109. Export Competition Declaration, supra note 105, para. 1.
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without a reference to the DDA.110 The WTO’s inability to
conclude its first negotiation round might be viewed as its
failure, but the outcome reflects the changing dynamics in
the international trading system post neoliberalism.
Developing countries, through various coalitions, were able
to put forward a difficult development agenda, such as
politically sensitive agricultural subsidy issues. They did not
prevail over the disagreements of the United States and the
EU, resulting in the impasse. However, this stalemate
suggested that the challenges developing countries mounted
were effective, resulting in partial successes such as the
elimination of agricultural export subsidies.111 The process
confirmed that the United States and the EU no longer
controlled rule-making in the MTS and could no longer
impose the one-size-fits-all, neoliberal approach that had
prevailed during the UR.112

110. See Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/mc11_e.htm [https://perma.cc/D
8ER-TYVG].
111. Export Competition Declaration, supra note 105, para. 6.
112. The FT View, supra note 108 (suggesting that “[a] better approach would
be plurilateral pacts among a group of governments, expanding to more countries
after their creation and eventually being multilateralised under WTO rules”).
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II. PROLIFERATION OF BILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM
A. “Exception” Becomes the Rule
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs),
including bilateral trade agreements, which aim to remove
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among the signatories
to the RTAs, is a salient feature of the international trading
system post neoliberalism. As of January 2020, 303 RTAs
were in force, which correspond to 483 notifications from
Members, counting goods, services and accessions
separately.113 This is a radical increase from 39 RTAs in force
when the UR was completed in 1994.114 The European
Economic Area (EEA), the North America Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement,
and the Southern Common Market (MECOSUR) are some of
the largest RTAs in force. Since RTAs provide preferential
market access exclusively to their members, they are
considered an exception to the general rule in the MTS based
on the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.
The MFN requirement is stipulated in GATT Article I.
The Article provides in relevant part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product

113. Regional trade agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts
[https://perma.cc/2SWC-GSGS];
see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements:
Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 597
(2011) (commenting on the proliferation of RTAs); Gonzalo Villalta Puig and
Omiunu Ohiocheoya, Regional Trade Agreements and the Neo-Colonialism of the
United States of America and the European Union: A Review of the Principle of
Competitive Imperialism, 32 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 225 (2011).
114. Regional Trade Agreeements Database, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://rtais.
wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx [https://perma.cc/QA67-RTZS].
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originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. 115

The MFN requirement prohibits discriminatory
treatment according to the origin of a product, and it is a key
legal requirement essential to sustain the MTS. Thus,
preferential treatment under RTAs is an important
departure from this principle.
The GATT nevertheless authorized the formation of
RTAs under qualifying circumstances to accommodate the
then-existing preferential trade arrangements among the
founding members.116 The number of RTAs remained
relatively small throughout the GATT regime (1948–1994),
as illustrated in the following figure.117 RTAs started to
increase substantially since the establishment of the WTO:
the number was 39 in 1994, increased to 83 in 2000, and to
214 in 2010.118

115. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. I, para. 1.
116. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV.
117. See Regional Trade Agreements Database, supra note 114. The number
was under five in the 60s and increased to 9 in 1973 and to 23 in 1986.
118. Id.
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119. Id.
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As discussed in the preceding Section, the long impasse
in the Doha Round has driven Members to focus on RTAs
outside the WTO, bilaterally or with a group of other
Members sharing stronger trade interests and closer
economic, regional, and political ties.120 As a result, nearly
every Member is a part of one or more RTAs,121 operating
both in the MTS under the auspices of the WTO and in one
or more preferential RTA regimes. RTAs cover more than
half of international trade and comprise the international
trading system alongside the MTS,122 thereby becoming a
rule, rather than an exception. The next two Sections discuss
the legal requirements for the formation of RTAs and the
issues arising from their proliferation.
B. Formation of Regional Trade Agreements
1. Regulatory Control
GATT Article XXIV and Article V of the General
Agreement on Services (GATS)123 regulate RTAs for trade in
goods and services, respectively. The 1979 Decision on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (“the
Enabling Clause”)124 also regulates preferential trade
agreements made among developing countries. The WTO

120. For a list of RTAs in force, see RTAs in force, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx [https://perma.cc/L9B5-4V9U].
121. Id. According to the WTO RTA map, all Members but Mauritania joined
one or more RTAs as of March 2020. Participation in Regional Trade Agreements,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_participa
tion_map_e.htm [https://perma.cc/48VX-DG5M].
122. Regional trade agreements are evolving – why does it matter?, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/regional-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/BP
46-RKVN].
123. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183 [hereinafter GATS].
124. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903
(Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D., at 203 (1980) [hereinafter GATT 1979].
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receives notifications, considers individual RTAs, and
monitors their operation through the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements (CRTA), established within the WTO
General Council for Trade.125 The CRTA has a mandate to
hold discussions on the systemic implications of the
agreements for the MTS.126
GATT Article XXIV authorizes formation of RTAs in the
form of a free trade area and a customs union.127 The Article
provides:
[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between
the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a
free-trade area.128

A free trade area created by RTAs liberalizes trade
among participating countries, but each participant
maintains its own trade policy. For example, each
participant sets a separate tariff schedule.129 A customs
union (e.g., the European Union) liberalizes trade internally
and also maintains common external trade policies such as a
common tariff schedule.130 GATS Article V also authorizes
“an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or
among the parties to such an agreement” without a
distinction between a free trade area and a customs union.131
125. Regional Trade Agreements: Committee, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm [https://perma.cc/
X85L-CRRG].; World Trade Organization, Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements: Decision of 6 Feb. 1996, WTO Doc. WT/L/127 (1996) [hereinafter
CRTA Decision].
126. CRTA Decision, supra note 125.
127. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para. 5.
128. Id.
129. LEE, supra note 2, at 179.
130. Id.
131. The distinction between a free trade area and a customs union is absent
because trade in service does not involve tariffs. GATS, supra note 123, art. V
para. 1. The Article provides, “This Agreement shall not prevent any of its
Members from being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade
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The Enabling Clause also authorizes Members to accord
differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries with respect to preferential trade agreements
concluded among developing countries.132
2. “Substantially All Trade”
The approval of RTAs is predicated on trade
liberalization. Thus, Article XXIV sets a regulatory threshold
for the approval of RTAs: for trade in goods, “substantially
all trade” must be liberalized (i.e., elimination of duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce).133 For trade in
services, there must be “substantial sectoral coverage,” and
“substantially all discrimination” must be absent or
eliminated in the covered sectors.134 Neither GATT Article
XXIV nor GATS Article V requires “complete” trade
liberalization for the approval of an RTA. In Turkey –
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,135
the Appellate Body noted the absence of an agreement on the
interpretation of the term “substantially” in GATT Article
XXIV.136 According to the Appellate Body, the term,
“substantially all the trade” is not the same as “all the trade,”
but considerably more than merely some of the trade.137 This
requires a degree of qualitative assessment, and it will not
be impossible to assign numerical guidelines such as a
percentage of trade in terms of quantity or value. This
provides Members negotiating RTAs with some discretion as
to the extent of trade liberalization.

in services between or among the parties to such an agreement . . . .” Id.
132. GATT 1979, supra note 124, para. 2(c).
133. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para. 8.
134. GATS, supra note 123, art. V, para. 1.
135. Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey
- Textiles].
136. Id. para. 48.
137. Id.
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The Appellate Body also found that the term
“substantially all the trade” has both qualitative and
quantitative components.138 For example, the qualitative
component suggests that RTAs that completely exclude a
sector, such as agriculture, may not meet this requirement
even if the quantity of trade in the excluded section may only
be small compared to the all trade covered by the RTA.139
According to the Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV, this requirement is not applied to RTAs
between developing countries approved under the Enabling
Clause.140 Thus, developing countries may pursue partial
trade liberalization under this scheme.
3. “Shall Not Be On the Whole Higher or More
Restrictive Than Before”
Article
XXIV
authorizes
preferential
trade
arrangements under RTAs, but does not authorize exclusive
trade blocks as seen in the 1930s.141 To prevent the formation
of exclusive and discriminatory trade blocks, Article XXIV
imposes a condition for the authorization of RTAs that “the
duties and other regulations of commerce imposed . . . shall
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the

138. Id. para. 49.
139. Some RTAs excluded agricultural sector altogether. The WTO Secretariat
issued a report in 1998 in which it “examined 69 FTAs and RTAs and stated that
54 FTA agreements excluded some agricultural products and, in 2 FTA
agreements, all of agricultural products were excluded.” Mitsuo Matsushita &
Yong-Shik Lee, Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements and Some Systemic Issues
- In Relation to the WTO Disciplines and Development Perspectives, 1 L. & DEV.
REV. 23, 32 (2008) (citing Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Background
Note by the Secretariat: Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/26 (May 5, 1998)). However, no examination
report by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements had been adopted due to
a lack of consensus. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 48, at 814.
140. GATT 1979, supra note 124, para. 2(c).
141. Such trade blocks provided trade preferences to the participants and
raised trade barriers such as higher tariffs to the countries outside the blocks,
worsening the global economic recession. LEE, supra note 2, at 180.
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general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce
. . . prior to the formation.”142
Article XXIV does not define what constitutes “higher or
more restrictive” duties and other regulations of commerce.
The Understanding on Interpretations of Article XXIV of the
GATT provides a guide in the case of tariffs: the weighted
average rate should be used to determine the restrictiveness
for the formation of a customs union.143 With respect to
“other regulations of commerce,” it would be difficult to
quantify and aggregate the regulations of commerce other
than tariffs for the purpose of comparison. Thus, individual
measures and regulations must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.144 It is debatable whether rules of origin are “other
regulations of commerce” under Article XXIV.145 According
to an argument, rules of origin are merely a means to decide
the place of origin for a product to determine whether the
product benefits from the preferential treatment of RTA, but
not a trade restriction.146 An opposing viewpoint states that
rules of origin operate as a de facto trade restriction even if
they are not a trade restriction per se.147 In the UR,
negotiators addressed this issue but did not reach an
agreement.148

142. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para 5.
143. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 219, para.
2.
144. Turkey - Textiles, supra note 135, para. 54. According to Turkey – Textiles,
an economic test should be performed to assess “trade restrictiveness.” Id. para.
55.
145. Matsushita & Lee, supra note 139, at 33–34.
146. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Examination of the North
American Free Trade Agreement: Note on the Meeting of 30 July 1996, WTO Doc.
WT/REG4/M/2 (Feb. 21, 1997).
147. Matsushita & Lee, supra note 139, at 34.
148. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Background Note by the
Secretariat: Systemic Issues Relating to “Other Regulations of Commerce”, WTO
Doc. WT/REG/W/17, para. 9 (Oct. 31, 1997).

2020]

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

447

C. Implications for the Multilateral Trading System
1. Fragmentation of Trade Disciplines
RTAs created in accordance with the requirements of
Article XXIV appear to be compatible with the objective of
the MTS, because they do not raise trade barriers vis-à-vis
non-RTA members. However, this does not remove the
inherent exclusivity of trade preferences afforded by RTAs
and still affects the trade of non-member countries adversely.
For example, suppose that country A and country B are both
subject to a tariff rate of 10 percent ad valorem on the export
of their smartphones to country C under the MFN
requirement. Suppose also that country A and country C
form an RTA and liberalize trade between them, and country
B is not a member of this RTA. After the conclusion of the
RTA, which eliminates the 10 percent tariff on smartphones
traded between country A and country C, the smartphone
exporters of country B will be disadvantaged vis-à-vis the
smartphone exporters from country A because their
smartphone exports remain subject to the 10 percent tariff
rate while no tariff is applied to the smartphones exported
from country A as a result of the RTA.
The disadvantage to the non-RTA members would be
greater where RTAs also reduce non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”).
NTBs, such as technical barriers to trade including product
safety and sanitary requirements, have become more
important, as multilateral trade negotiations have reduced
tariffs have across the board.149 RTAs may reduce NTBs and
enhance trade between the members by including terms to
facilitate mutual cooperation of the technical standards and
product safety requirements.150 RTAs may also remove or

149. Doha Declaration, supra note 79.
150. For example, Article 9 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United
States of America and the Republic of Korea (US – Korea FTA) mandates such
cooperation. See The United States – Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S.,
art. 9, Dec. 3, 2010, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
korus-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/H59G-FW7B].
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reduce trade remedy measures. Some RTAs, including the
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, abolish trade remedy
measures such as anti-dumping measures. These
preferences will benefit the exporters of the member
countries in the exclusion of the non-members. The reduction
or removal of trade barriers also applies to trade in services
where the service sectors are covered by the RTA. RTAs set
a preferred regulatory regime for the benefit of the member
countries to the exclusion of the non-members, leading to
fragmentation of trade disciplines.
RTAs also set forth trade disciplines beyond NTBs.
These disciplines include separate rules of origin,151 rules for
international investment and intellectual property rights,
and separate dispute settlement procedures. These RTAs
rules may vary from the WTO provisions covering the
relevant areas. As a result, their proliferations add
complexity and confusion to the international trading
system, which runs counter to the objective of the MTS.152
Large RTAs create substantial overlaps in membership
among Members. 153 As a result, multiple RTAs are applied
to trade between identical members, causing a considerable
regulatory burden on the customs at borders that have to

151. It is subject to argument that the rules of origin must be included among
NTBs, in which case the discussion of NTBs should be placed in the preceding
paragraph. See discussion supra Section II.B.
152. The preamble of the WTO Agreement sets out the objectives. It states in
relevant part, WTO Members are “desirous of contributing to these objectives by
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” See WTO
Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.; see also Adrian Johnston & Michael Trebilcock,
Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights from the Global Investment
Regime, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 621 (2013).
153. Yong Shik Lee & Kwangkug Kim, Tripartite Free Trade Agreement among
China, Korea, and Japan: A Step Towards Economic Integration in Northeast
Asia?, in REGIONAL COOPERATION AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ASIA 129
(Jiaxiang Hu & M. Vanhullebusch eds., 2014).
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process imports under the terms of multiple RTAs and those
engaged in trade who have to understand those terms.154
The complexity and confusion caused by the proliferation
of RTAs add to the transaction cost, which is not conducive
to the expansion of trade. The following figure illustrates
how complex the fragmentations could be with multiple and
overlapping RTAs applying to trade.

Figure 2: RTAs in force and negotiation (2020)155

154. For this, Professor Matsushita argues the necessity of an “FTA network”
in which FTA officials are frequently convened and discuss trade rules and other
matters with the view to convergence. See Mitsuo Matsushita, View on Future
Roles of The WTO: Should There be More Soft Law in The WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 701, 701 (2014).
155. ASEAN Member States, ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,
https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (listing
the members of ASEAN); Yen Nee Lee, The world’s largest trade deal could be
signed in 2020 – and the U.S. isn’t in it, CNBC (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.cnbc
.com/2019/11/12/what-is-rcep-asia-pacific-trade-deal-slated-to-be-worlds-largest-
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2. Weakening of the MTS
The long impasse of the Doha Round and the inability of
the WTO to conclude the Round have raised questions about
the future of the WTO in at least two of its key areas:
multilateral trade negotiations and setting trade rules. 156
The significant difference in the Members’ positions on the
key issues, such as agricultural subsidies, caused deadlock
in the Doha negotiation process.157 In addition, the
proliferation of RTAs affected negotiations in the Doha
Round, because Members—by focusing on RTAs—diverted
manpower and resources available for trade negotiations
from the Doha Round to a number of RTAs.158 The RTA drive
by major Members like the United States weakened the
momentum for continuing the Doha Round. The proliferation
of RTAs and increased Member participation in RTAs had
adverse ramifications for the Doha Round and the MTS.
The WTO may have become a victim of its own success.
With its current membership of 164 countries, each with an
equal vote, the institution may have reached a point where
another successful “round” of negotiations has become very
difficult due to the vast divergence in interests and priorities
among many Members, each with vastly different economic

fta.html (listing the members of RCEP and noting that India ultimately
withdrew); James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific
Partnership?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (listing the members of TPP
and noting the U.S. ultimately withdrew); Chris Buckley & Terril Yue Jones,
East Asian powes set to push trade pact talks, Reuters (May 12, 2012), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-summit/east-asian-powers-set-to-push-tradepact-talks-idUSBRE84C00V20120513 (discussing the negotiations for the ChinaJapan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement); USMCA, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/usmca (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (listing the
members of USMCA).
156. See discussion supra Section I.C.
157. See supra Section I.C.
158. By November 2015, the United States had been engaged in the
negotiations of 12 RTAs, European Union in 31 RTAs, and Canada, Japan, and
South Korea in 14, 17, and 14 RTAs, respectively, since 2001. See Regional Trade
Agreements, supra note 113.
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and trade capacities and political influence. Therefore, RTAs
among a smaller group of countries sharing a set of common
interests and priorities might be a more feasible means to
develop trade relations.159 This explains the proliferation of
RTAs during the Doha Round, which may well be a natural
course of development. Nonetheless, RTAs do not replace the
MTS,160 because RTAs, including mega RTAs such as EU,
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN, are not designed to
accommodate the divergent interests and priorities of
trading nations on a global scale. The Members addressed
this point at the Nairobi Ministerial and reaffirmed “the
need to ensure that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)
remain complementary to, not a substitute for, the
multilateral trading system.”161 The proliferation of RTAs
may have weakened the MTS, but most of the Members are
not willing to discard the latter for RTAs.162

159. A study examined the impact of the Doha Round impasses on the
proliferation of RTAs. See Stephen W. Hartman, The WTO, the Doha Round
Impasse, PTAs, and FTAs/RTAs, 27 INT’L TRADE J. 411 (2013).
160. Director-General Roberto Azevêdo noted that bilateral and regional trade
agreements have been “growing rapidly” but stressed that “there are many big
issues which can only be tackled in an efficient manner in the multilateral
context through the WTO.” See Regional initiatives cannot substitute for the
multilateral trading system—Azevêdo, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 24, 2015), https
://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra50_e.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
161. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December, 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (2015).
162. Id.
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III. PROTECTIONISM FROM THE UNITED STATES
A. Trade Protectionism under the Trump Administration
This Part examines the third development in
international trade law and practice post neoliberalism: the
new trade protectionism from the United States under the
Trump administration. The election of Donald Trump as the
forty-fifth President of the United States marked a new era
for U.S. trade policy. Shortly after taking office in 2017, he
discarded his predecessor’s outward and engaging trade
policy, including the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement, and made a swift policy change toward
protectionism.163 He argued that his protectionist trade
policy would bring back jobs and more income for working
people in the United States. Trade protection through tariff
hikes and other means would raise the prices of imported
products and reduce their quantities, thereby improving the
competitiveness of domestic products in the domestic
market. This, in turn, would create more jobs and income for
workers in the United States.164
President Trump’s argument may appear plausible, but
a deeper examination points to a very different outcome.
Even if foreign and domestic businesses were to set up more
manufacturing facilities in the United States to avoid high
tariffs, such policy is unlikely to create more jobs and income
for domestic workers. If manufacturers were compelled to
produce in the United States, hiring American workers and
paying higher wages than they would elsewhere, they would
try to reduce employment by adopting labor-saving,
automated production processes. This policy will not increase
employment over time. Trade protection also instigates
retaliation from abroad, as witnessed in the aftermath of the

163. John King & Jeremy Diamond, Trump team floats a 10% tariff on imports,
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trumptariffs/ [ https://perma.cc/937E-A6GB].
164. Id.
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steel and aluminum tariffs.165 Such retaliation would reduce
U.S. exports and cause job losses in the export industries.
Therefore, the more likely policy outcome from trade
protection is the rise of consumer prices on account of the
higher tariffs on imported products, without corresponding
increases in jobs and income. 166
Notwithstanding the expected adverse policy outcome,167
the new administration proceeded to implement the
protectionist trade policy. The administration withdrew from
the TPP Agreement that previous administrations strived to
conclude for a decade, demanded re-negotiation of major
trade agreements such as U.S. – Korea Free Trade
Agreement and North American Free Trade Agreement,
escalated a trade war with China, and adopted sweeping
steel and aluminum tariffs on an unprecedented scale. The
adoption of tariffs itself does not necessarily mean a change
of trade policy toward protectionism; the previous
administrations also adopted them through trade measures
authorized by the WTO such as anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures, and safeguard measures. However,
as discussed in the following two Sections, the trade
measures adopted by the Trump administration are
unprecedented to the point that the use of the term
“protectionism” is warranted.
The United States remains the world’s largest economy
and trader, and its trade policy has a significant impact on
the world economy and international trade. Thus, the policy
shift toward protectionism has raised substantial concerns
around the world168 and requires examination. The following
Sections discuss two incidents that reflect the U.S. trade

165. See infra note 242.
166. Lee, supra note 24, at 230–31.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., James Politi, A WTO warning for Donald Trump, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5ff5538c-5a0d-11e9-9dde-7aed
ca0a081a [https://perma.cc/WQF9-KS2U].
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policy. The first incident discussed is the recent trade war
with China and its ramifications for the MTS, which began
with the imposition of tariffs by the Trump administration.
The second is the adoption of steel and aluminum tariffs by
the United States for the alleged protection of its national
security.

B. Trade War with China
On July 6, 2018 and August 23, 2018, the United States
imposed 25 percent tariffs ad valorem on US $34 billion
worth of imports from China (818 tariff subheadings) and
again on US $16 billion (279 tariff subheadings),
respectively.169 Prior to this imposition, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated an
investigation into certain acts, policies, and practices of
China related to technology transfer, intellectual property,
and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
(Section 301).170 Section 301 authorizes the U.S. government
to adopt trade measures if the acts, policies, and practices (of
the foreign government) covered in the investigation are
unreasonable or discriminatory and if they burden or restrict
U.S. commerce.171 However, the WTO-consistency of Section
301 action is questionable when it is taken without approval
under the terms of WTO disciplines.172

169. Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed
Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,
83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20, 2018); Notice of Action Pursuant to Section 301:
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,823 (Aug. 16, 2018).
170. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012).
171. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
172. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
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Under sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act,173 the
USTR made the following determinations: (i) China uses
foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture
requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various
administrative review and licensing processes, to require or
pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies; (ii)
China’s regime of technology regulations forces U.S.
companies seeking to license technologies to Chinese entities
to do so on non-market based terms that favor Chinese
recipients; (iii) China directs and unfairly facilitates the
systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies
and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge
technologies and intellectual property and generate the
transfer of technology to Chinese companies; (iv) China
conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and
theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies to
access their sensitive commercial information and trade
secrets.174 The President subsequently authorized the
increased tariffs on this determination.175
China’s practice in intellectual property rights (IPRs)
and its industrial policy to support strategic industries, such
as “Made in China 2025,” were direct causes of the U.S.
action. The United States argued that it raised concerns on
IPR issues repeatedly with China, but China was unwilling
to offer meaningful modifications to its unfair practices.176 A

173. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b), 2414(a).
174. Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning
Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies,
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906, 14,907 (Apr. 16, 2018).
175. On the grounds of (i), (iii), and (iv) in the determination, the United States
chose to file a complaint with the WTO on the technology licensing regulations.
See Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Certain Measures
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1,
IP/D/38 (Mar. 26, 2018).
176. Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation,
83 Fed. Reg. 47,974, 47,975 (Sep. 21, 2018).
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USTR report also states that trade analysts from several
U.S. government agencies identified products that benefit
from Chinese industrial policies, including Made in China
2025, indicating that the U.S. measures were, at least in
part, motivated to check against China’s industrial drive.177
China defended its policies and objected to the U.S. tariffs,
imposing approximately US $50 billion of retaliatory tariffs
on imports from the United States.178 The United States
responded and escalated the situation by imposing
additional tariffs on the unprecedented US $200 billion
worth of imports from China (5,745 full and partial tariff
subheadings) at 10 percent ad valorem on September 24,
2018, to be increased to 25 percent ad valorem on January 1,
2019.179 Talks ensued between the two countries, leading to
an agreed outcome that suspended tariff hikes.180
The U.S. concerns about China’s IPR practice and its
industrial policy have some legitimate grounds.181 Indeed,
other WTO Members such as the EU have also raised
concerns about China’s IPR practice.182 Nonetheless, the
unilateral action by the United States under Section 301 is
not consistent with WTO legal disciplines. Article 23.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides in
relevant part:

177. Notice of Determination, 83 Fed. Reg. at 14,907.
178. Notice of Modification, 83 Fed. Reg. at 47,974.
179. Id.
180. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, U.S.China, Jan. 15, 2020, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6656794/UST
R-Economic-and-Trade-Agreement-Between-the.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDS9-ED
7M].
181. Id.
182. See Request for Consultations by the European Union, China - Certain
Measures on the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1, G/L/1244,
IP/D/39 (June 6, 2018).
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2. Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been
impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding,
and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings
contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB
or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
...
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the
level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain
DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before
suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to
implement the recommendations and rulings within that
reasonable period of time.183

Article 23.2 prohibits unilateral trade measures in
response to the perceived breach of WTO obligations. On a
dispute concerning Section 301, the previous WTO dispute
settlement panel also held that taking unilateral actions
against other WTO member countries without first securing
approval under the terms of the DSU would be inconsistent
with the WTO disciplines. 184 The prior U.S. administrations
have refrained from adopting unilateral trade measures
under Section 301, and their revival on such an
unprecedented scale signals the new U.S. trade
protectionism.
C. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs
On March 23, 2018, the United States imposed 25
percent and 10 percent increases in tariffs on all imported
steel and iron products and all entries of aluminum products
respectively, affecting $29 billion of steel trade and $17

183. DSU, supra note 172, art. 23, para. 2.
184. Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of The Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000).
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billion of aluminum trade.185 The U.S. steel and aluminum
tariffs are unprecedented in scale (in the amount of affected
trade in the covered product categories) and unusual in the
rationale—the protection of national security—which has
rarely been invoked for trade measures. Prior to the
implementation, the Department of Commerce investigated
the national security effect of imports of steel and aluminum
products under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962,186 and submitted final reports by January of 2018.187
The reports underscored that steel and aluminum are
essential to U.S. national security and that increased
imports had weakened domestic industries producing these
products.188 They concluded that the measures to reduce
imports of these steel and aluminum products were
necessary to strengthen domestic steel and aluminum
industries that are essential to national security.189
The unprecedented U.S. measures led to strong criticism
from major steel and aluminum exporters around the world.
Several Members, including the EU, China, Japan, Mexico,
Canada, India, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey,
filed complaints with the WTO.190 These Members disagreed
that the U.S. measures were necessary to protect national
185. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 15, 2018); Proclamation
No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 15, 2018).
186. As amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
187. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National
Security: An Investigation Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, As Amended (2018) [hereinafter Steel Report]; U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security: An
Investigation Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
As Amended (2018) [hereinafter Aluminum Report].
188. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 2; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at
2.
189. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 2; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at
2.
190. See Panels established to review US steel and aluminum tariffs,
countermeasures on US imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/2LCF-E
QEW].
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security concerns and concluded that the tariffs are a
disguised trade protection inconsistent with WTO
disciplines.191 There is history that supports this view. The
United States has attempted to protect its declining domestic
steel and aluminum industries for decades by adopting
multiple trade measures, including a number of antidumping measures.192 Thus, Members did not give credence
to the national security argument that the United States
raised to justify the steel and aluminum tariffs and
considered it another pretext for the protection of domestic
industries for a commercial purpose.193
Regardless of the U.S. motive, GATT Article XXI
authorizes the application of a measure that a Member
“considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests.” 194 However, the scope of the national
security interests defined by the U.S. government does not
seem to be compatible with the requirement of the Article.
While Article XXI does not define “essential security
interests,” the Article limits the scope of these interests to
those (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials; (ii)
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying
a military establishment; and (iii) taken in time of war or
other emergency in international relations. 195
Notwithstanding the limitations in Article XXI, the U.S.
authorities defined the scope of the national security
interests too broadly. The Department of Commerce
191. Id.
192. For the imposition of anti-dumping measures, see Anti-dumping Sectoral
Distribution of Measures: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995 – 30/06/2019, WORLD
TRADE ORG. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_Sectoral_Measures
ByRepMem.pdf [https://perma.cc/T86B-RX5J].
193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for
their complaints).
194. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXI.
195. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXI(b).
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investigation reports identify the essential security interests
as “national defense” and “critical infrastructure.” 196 The
measures required for national defense are likely justified
under Article XXI. However, there is a question about the
necessity to cover infrastructure needs under the essential
national security, particularly when the needs are as broad
and diverse as listed in the reports. The reports include all
sorts
of
items,
such
as
“chemical
production,
communications, dams, energy, food production, nuclear
reactors, transportation systems, water, and waste water
systems” (in the steel report),197 as well as “[e]lectric power
transmission and distribution . . . [a]ircraft, automobiles,
railroad freight cars, boats, ships, trains, trucks, trailers,
wheels . . . [c]abinets, cans, foils, storage bins, storage tanks
. . . [b]ridges, structural supports, conduit, piping, siding,
doors, windows, wiring . . . [m]achinery, stampings, castings,
forgings, product components, consumer goods, heating and
cooling devices, and utility lighting fixtures” (in the
aluminum report).198
The reports do not justify the inclusion of such a broad
range of items, including a variety of transportation devices
and all components of construction, as relevant to the
essential national security interests. If Members were
allowed to include items of everyday use without particular
security connotations (e.g., windows, cabinets, consumer
goods) for the purpose of national security protection under
Article XXI, they could use Article XXI to justify trade
measures on every conceivable product, such as automobiles
(another key product that has been investigated under
Section 232), semiconductors, ships, and many others, citing
their protection as somehow necessary to protect national
security interests. If Members could invoke Article XXI for

196. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 23; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at
24, 36.
197. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 23–24.
198. Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at 24.
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the protection of any product for its feeble connection to
“essential security interests”—as defined by the Member—
the MTS will not be sustainable. The United States argued
that the issues of national security are political matters not
susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO
dispute settlement,199 but a recent WTO panel held that the
WTO has jurisdiction to review issues arising under Article
XXI.200 The unprecedented steel and aluminum tariffs that
are unlikely WTO-compliant represent new trade
protectionism from the United States.

199. See Communication from the United States, United States – Certain
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/13 (June 11,
2018).
200. Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc.
WT/DS512/R, paras. 7.53–7.58 (adopted Apr. 5, 2019) (asserting that the panel
has jurisdiction to review Article XXI matters).
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IV. CALL FOR REGULATORY REFORM
The preceding Parts discussed the issues of international
trade law post neoliberalism, including the development
deficits, the proliferation of bilateralism and regionalism,
and trade protectionism from the United States. Building on
this discussion, this final Part proposes possible regulatory
reforms to address the identified problems in the current
trade disciplines.
A. Remedying Development Deficits
The UR, which adopted the neoliberal “one-size-fits-all”
approach, produced the rules of international law that
exhibit the development deficits.201 The current S&D
treatment has proved to be inadequate to meet the
development interests of developing countries,202 and some
of the key provisions, such as the SCM Agreement, deprive
developing countries of the ability to adopt effective
development policies proven in successful development
cases.203 The following discussion introduces proposals to
remedy development deficits in the current disciplines.
1. Development-Facilitating Tariff (DFT)
The current WTO disciplines create difficulties for
developing countries in need of a flexible tariff schedule to
facilitate domestic industries. GATT Article II provides:
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that
provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule
annexed to this Agreement.
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to
any contracting party, which are the products of territories of other
contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to
which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or

201. See discussion supra Section I.A.
202. See discussion supra Section I.A.
203. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges
of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in
excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those
directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by
legislation in force in the importing territory on that date. 204

The principle of binding concessions under Article II
provides essential stability for the international trading
system. However, it also restricts the ability of developing
countries to adopt tariff measures above the maximum
binding rates to promote domestic industries for
development purposes. Notwithstanding the controversy
regarding the effectiveness of the tariff protection as means
of facilitating domestic industries and fostering economic
development, provisions of the GATT such as Article XVIII
approve measures for this purpose.
Article XVIII, as discussed above,205 has certain limits: it
requires developing countries to conduct negotiations with
other interested Members and offer compensation in the
form of trade concessions (e.g., lowering tariff rates).206 Such
negotiations may take a considerable amount of time and
cause delays in implementing necessary measures for
development purposes.207 The required compensation may
also burden the developing countries facing economic
constraints, which would contradict their development
interests. This multilateral scrutiny (i.e., negotiation and
compensation requirement) embedded in Article XVIII
diminishes its effectiveness as a tool for development;
Members have never invoked Article XVIII since the
beginning of the WTO, except to address balance of payment
issues.208 This calls for regulatory adjustment to improve its

204. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. II, paras. 1(a)–(b).
205. See discussion supra Section I.A.
206. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 7.
207. See discussion supra Section I.A.
208. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 48, at 501 (citing a few cases of Article
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use.
To remedy this problem, the “Development-Facilitation
Tariff” or “DFT” has been proposed.209 The DFT scheme sets
the maximum additional tariff rate above the tariff binding
under Article II for the purpose of assisting with the
facilitation of domestic industries.210 Different maximum
DFT rates are to be assigned to individual developing
countries on a sliding scale in accordance with its level of
economic development, measured by relevant economic
indicators such as per-capita gross national income (GNI)
figures.211 For example, suppose that the maximum DFT
rate is set at 100 percent over the tariff binding, and the
threshold for an eligible developing country to benefit from a
DFT is US $8,000 per capita GNI. In that case, countries
with a higher per-capita income than US $8,000 will not be
eligible for a DFT. Country A with the per capita GNI of US
$2,000, which is 25 percent of the threshold income, will be
allowed to apply a DFT of 75 percent (100 percent x (100
percent – 25 percent) = 75 percent). County B with the per
capita GNI of US $6,000, which is 75 percent of the threshold
income, will be allowed to apply a DFT of 25 percent (100
percent x (100 percent – 75 percent) = 25 percent). The DFT
scheme does not impose negotiation and compensation
requirements on developing countries to improve its use. In
lieu of these requirements, the DFT scheme introduces a
series of procedural safeguards, including a public hearing,
notice, a report setting forth rationales for the proposed
increase in tariffs, and gradual liberalization and
XVIII invocations).
209. Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the World Trading System—
A Proposal for Development Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitation
Subsidy, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 935, 942–48 (2004); see also Yong-Shik Lee, WTO
Disciplines and Economic Development: A Reform Proposal, 1 J. INT’L & COMP. L.
293, 300–01 (2014); Yong-Shik Lee, The Long and Winding Road – Path Towards
Facilitation of Development in the WTO: Reflections on the Doha Round and
Beyond, 9 L. DEV. REV. 437, 450–51 (2016).
210. Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra note 209, at 450.
211. Id.
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elimination of the DFT after a set period of time, to reduce
the possibility of abuse.212
2. Development-Facilitating Subsidy (DFS)
Government subsidies are an important tool for
economic development, as recognized in the SCM
Agreement.213 However, the SCM Agreement prohibits key
trade-related subsidies, such as export subsidies and importsubstitution subsidies.214 Other subsidies that affect the
trade of other Members adversely are also made “actionable,”
i.e., subject to trade sanctions including countervailing
measures under the SCM Agreement.215 As Dani Rodrik has
explained, the current trade rules have made “a significant
dent in the ability of developing countries to employ
intelligently-designed industrial policies.”216
The historical accounts demonstrate that subsidies have
played an important role in the economic development of
today’s developed countries.217 Thus, it stands to reason that
developing countries should be accorded an option to adopt
necessary subsidies without the risk of retaliation or rule
breach. The concept of the sliding income scale, adopted in
the DFT, can also be applied to authorize subsidies that are
otherwise prohibited or actionable under the current SCM
Agreement. The “Development-Facilitation Subsidy” (“DFS”)

212. See, e.g., SA, supra note 42, arts. 3, 7, 12.
213. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the SCM provision
that recognizes the role).
214. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3.
215. Id. arts. 5–7.
216. Rodrik, supra note 19, at 34–35.
217. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 19–21. For instance, the United Kingdom
provided extensive export subsidies to textile products in the eighteenth century.
Id. at 21–22. The United States offered subsidies to railway companies in the
nineteenth century and invested heavily in research and development of new
technologies. Id. at 30–31. Germany also subsidized a number of industries,
including textiles and metals. Id. at 33–34. Other developed countries today,
including France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, and the East Asian countries
(NICs) all provided subsidies to promote their industries. Id. at 35–51.
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can be introduced for the benefit of developing countries
under certain per-capita income thresholds as in the DFT.218
The DFS scheme allows developing countries to adopt the
currently prohibited or actionable subsidies in accordance
with their per-capita income status.219 For example, if the
income threshold is US $8,000 and a developing country’s
GNI per capita is US $6,000, which is 75 percent of the
income threshold, the country is authorized to adopt a
subsidy equivalent to 25 percent (100 percent – 75 percent)
of the product value.
The DFS cannot be used to support exports from
developing countries that are already competitive in export
industries whose share in the export market is above pre-set
thresholds, since the objective of the DFS is to promote
economic development through export facilitation. Further,
developing countries that are already competitive in the
export market of the concerned product would not need this
subsidy for export facilitation. For example, if the threshold
export market share is 10 percent, a developing country
Member that takes up 15 percent of the export market will
not be eligible to adopt the DFS in the corresponding product
category. If a developing country’s export market share is 5
percent, the country may adopt the DFS, according to the
income scale, until it reaches the threshold market share but
not after. The procedural requirements to prevent abuse,
such as those listed for the DFT (e.g., a public hearing, notice,
a report setting forth rationales for the proposed increase in
tariffs, and gradual liberalization and elimination of the DFT
after a set period of time), are also applicable to the DFS
scheme.

218. Lee, Facilitating Development, supra note 209, at 948–53; Lee, WTO
Disciplines, supra note 209, at 301–02; Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra
note 209, at 451–52.
219. Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra note 209, at 459.
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3. Reforming Administered Protection
The preceding discussion has identified anti-dumping
measures and countervailing measures as adverse to the
development interests of developing countries.220 The
problems with countervailing measures will be reduced with
the introduction of the DFS, as these measures will not be
applicable against the DFS. However, the issues with antidumping measures remain and need to be addressed. As
discussed earlier, anti-dumping measures are applicable
when imports are “dumped,” i.e., sold at prices below normal
value.221 The normal value is determined by comparison to
the home price or, where a proper comparison cannot be
made due to the market situation or a low sales volume in
the domestic market, to an export price in a third country.222
The normal value can also be “constructed” with costs and
reasonable profits.223 This flexibility accords the importing
country a degree of latitude in anti-dumping determination.
For example, there may be multiple home market prices
to compare, and the determination of a reference home price
will require a complex calculation of an adjusted average.224
Where an investigator has to make a comparison to an export
price in a third country, there may exist substantially
different, multiple prices. Where an investigator has to
“construct” a normal value, the outcome may vary depending
on the specific methodology that the investigator chooses to
adopt to calculate costs and “reasonable profit,” the measure
of which can also vary.225 Considering the flexibility enjoyed
by investigators, national investigating authorities virtually
have a free hand to determine the existence of dumping and
the dumping margin. The DDA included limited reform
proposals, including clarifying and improving disciplines

220. See discussion supra Section I.A.
221. ADP Agreement, supra note 51, art. 1; see discussion supra Section I.A.
222. ADP Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 1–2.
223. Id. art. 2.
224. LEE, supra note 2, at 122.
225. Id.
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under the ADP Agreement, 226 but these limited proposals
are unlikely to remove the inherent arbitrariness from the
anti-dumping regime.
A deeper reform which restrains the imposition of antidumping measures against imports from developing
countries altogether is necessary. Major developing
countries, such as China and India, are among the frequent
users of anti-dumping measures. For the period from July 1,
2017 to June 30, 2018, India, Argentina, China, and Brazil
were reported to have adopted 43, 13, 12, and 10 definitive
anti-dumping measures, respectively, while the United
States, the EU, and Canada adopted 34, 6, and 2 measures,
respectively.227 Increasing anti-dumping measures also
target imports from developed countries as well as from
developing countries. Anti-dumping measures might be a
politically expedient tool for import control due to the
regulatory flexibility, but most economists question the
economic justification of anti-dumping measures.228 The
GATS also does not have a provision for anti-dumping
measures applied in the service trade. Given the weak
economic justifications, consideration may also be given to
completely removing anti-dumping measures from the MTS.
Some RTAs, including Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
have abolished anti-dumping measures.
B. Bridging the Gap between the MTS and the RTAs
Another area that requires regulatory reform is RTAs.
The widespread derogation from the MFN principle with the
proliferation of RTAs is one of the most important issues
affecting the future of the MTS. The MFN tariff rates and
the other conditions of trade agreed at the WTO negotiations
no longer present the conditions of trade applicable to all
226. Doha Declaration, supra note 79.
227. World Trade Organization, Report (2018) of the Committee on AntiDumping Practices, Annex C, WTO Doc. G/L/1270, G/ADP/25 (Oct. 29, 2018).
228. LEE, supra note 2, at 119–20.
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WTO membership, but merely a baseline, and exclusive
trade preferences are prevalent. The gaps between the MTS
and the RTAs are widening with the proliferation of the
latter and need to be bridged. A possible solution may include
a gradual elimination of trade barriers within RTAs at more
or less the same rate and on the same timetable as the
lowering of barriers towards non-members.229 Under this
solution (despite a significant free rider problem), the
discriminatory effect of RTAs against non-members would be
minimized. However, there is a coordination problem with
this scenario: RTAs have their own timetables for trade
liberalization and may not necessarily follow the suggested
approach and set pace according to the reduction of trade
barriers to non-member countries.
Alternatively, a “sunset policy,” which prescribes a
limitation on the duration of RTA preferences to a pre-set
period, may present a solution.230 The present rules (Article
XXIV) do not limit the life of an RTA or the trade preferences
that it offers. Thus, RTAs run in perpetuity unless the
participants terminate the agreement under its terms. One
way to limit the deviation from the MFN principle would be
to limit RTA preferences to a pre-determined time period and
then require RTA members to extend trade preferences to
the entire WTO membership on an MFN basis. RTA
members will not have an incentive to comply with this
without reciprocal compensation. Thus, the following
collective action would be required: most likely there will be
more RTAs that a member of an RTA has not joined than
those it has. This means that the member will receive more
trade preferences than it extends at any given time if trade
229. Renato Ruggiero, former general-director of the WTO, observed this
possibility in certain regional trade areas such as APEC and MERCOSUR. Press
Release, World Trade Organization, Regional Initiatives Should Aim for a Free
Global Market, Says Ruggiero (Apr. 24, 1996), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A8RT-M82P].
230. Yong Shik Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading
System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development
Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 625, 637 (2011).
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preferences in all RTAs are to be extended to the entire WTO
membership.231

231. See id. A question has been raised as to how to reconcile wide and deep
RTAs with much shallower ones. There is a possibility that Members with a few
but major RTAs with their key export markets may not show much interest in
the other RTAs, which may not offer attractive export markets to them. An
alternative approach to the compulsory sunset policy would be to agree on the
sunset policy on a voluntary, plurilateral basis. However, this alternative
arrangement may raise an issue of “prisoner’s dilemma” discussed in the game
theory: when an optimal outcome for everyone is expected only with everyone’s
cooperation, one may still not cooperate because it does not know whether the
other party will also cooperate. Where it is offered as voluntary, not as a
compulsory measure, joining the voluntary arrangement will be an uncertain
proposition for a WTO Member. Without knowing whether the other members
will join the voluntary arrangement, a Member may not be willing to embark on
the potentially costly process to persuade the domestic constituency to accept the
MFN extension of their RTA preferences. The proposed compulsory policy may
have a better political traction than in the past: a systematic concern about the
multiplicity of rules as a result of the proliferation of RTAs and the resulting
confusion and instability, which will raise cost in trade, may also encourage
Members to look more favorably on the MFN extension of RTA preferences. Id.
at 640 n.64.
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The following table illustrates the point, applying the
game theory. An RTA member or a “group” will lose if it
extends trade preference unilaterally, but it will gain, along
with every other RTA member, if all of them extend trade
preferences to the entire membership by cooperation.232

RTA Group A
extends trade
preferences
RTA Group A does
not extend trade
preferences

The other RTA
groups extend trade
preferences.
Outcome A: Both
RTA Group A and
the other RTA groups
win
Outcome C: RTA
Group A wins and
the other RTA groups
lose

The other RTA
groups do not extend
trade preferences.
Outcome B: RTA
Group A loses and
the other RTA
groups win
Outcome D: Neither
RTA Group or the
other RTA groups
win or lose.

Table 1: Extension of Trade Preferences by RTA Group233
Outcome D represents the status quo: no RTA group
extends trade preferences to non-members, so no group wins
or loses. Outcome A represents a result of collective action or
cooperation: all RTA groups win. The optimal cooperation
can be facilitated by the revised WTO rule that limits the life
of exclusive RTA preferences and requires the extension of
trade preferences to all WTO Members after a predetermined
period of time.234 This extension of trade preferences would
also increase the level of trade liberalization across the
board.235

232. Id.
233. Id. at 639.
234. Id. at 641. A period of fifteen years has been suggested. Fifteen years will
be sufficiently long: few RTAs ever visage at the inception trade benefits to be
gained from exclusive trade preferences beyond this time period.
235. However, consideration should be given to waiving the extension
requirement for developing countries to meet their development interests. See id.
at 644–47.
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Finally, a determination needs to be made about the
kinds of trade preference to be extended on the MFN basis.
Tariffs will be straightforward, and the removal of tariffs
among RTA members can be extended to non-members on
the MFN basis after the pre-set time period. NTBs, however,
are more complex and require further consideration. For
example, mutual approval of professional qualifications and
product standards among RTA members are likely to have
been agreed after examination of the professional
qualification requirements and the level of product
standards of the members.236 As such, the MFN extension of
these types of regulatory preferences may not be appropriate
where the requirements and standards of the non-members
may vary and may not be suitable for recognition for the
members extending them. In contrast, removal of some other
types of NTBs, which is not influenced by a standard or
qualification, such as an abolishment of a cap on foreign
ownership of a designated industry, may be appropriate for
the MFN extension.237 A case-by-case examination would be
necessary with respect to the NTBs to be liberalized on the
MFN basis.
C. Dealing with Trade Protectionism: A Few Suggestions
Protectionist trade policies and measures undermine the
trade interests of Members on the receiving end. An example
is the recent steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the
United States.238 The Article XXI justification for these
tariffs is questionable,239 and several Members have filed
complaints with the WTO.240 However, the dispute
settlement process may take years, and in the meantime the

236. Lee, supra note 230, at 642.
237. Id.
238. See discussion supra Section III.C.
239. See discussion supra Section III.C.
240. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the record of
complaints).
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exporting Members subject to the tariffs sustain injury. Even
if the complaining Members ultimately win in the process,
the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) provides only a
prospective remedy that requires the offending Member to
bring their measures in conformity with their obligations
under WTO disciplines, without compensating the exporters
for the injury sustained from the measures.241 Thus,
arguably, the dispute settlement process does not deter
determined Members from adopting offending measures due
to its inherent limitations.
In response to protectionist tariffs from the U.S., several
exporting Members have adopted retaliatory tariffs against
imports from the United States.242 However, the consistency

241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text
242. See, e.g., European Union, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of
the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/EU/1 (May 18,
2018); Russian Federation, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the
Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/RUS/2 (May 22,
2018); China, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of
Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the
Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/CHN/1 (May 22, 2018); Turkey,
Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the
Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other
Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on
Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/TUR/6 (May 22, 2018); India, Immediate
Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council
for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations
Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO
Doc. G/SG/N/12/IND/1/Rev.1 (June 14, 2018); Customs Notice 18-08: Surtaxes
Imposed on Certain Products Originating in the United States, CAN. BORDER
SERVS. AGENCY (June 29, 2018, Revised July 11, 2018), https://www.cbsaasfc.gc.ca/publications/cn-ad/cn18-08-eng.html
[https://perma.cc/Q7CJ-G4Y8].
(Can.); Decreto por el que se modifica la Tarifa de la Ley de los Impuestos
Generales de Importación y de Exportación, el Decreto por el que se establece la
Tasa Aplicable durante 2003, del Impuesto General de Importación, para las
mercancías originarias de América del Norte y el Decreto por el que se establecen
diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 05-06-2018 (Mex.).
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of these retaliatory tariffs with WTO disciplines is also
questionable.243 Besides the WTO-compliance issue, this
type of retaliatory response may also escalate into a trade
war, such as the recent one between the United States and
China.244 In addition to the risk of causing a trade war,
immediate retaliation may not offer a full remedy to the
injured export industries. The revenue collected from the
retaliatory measures (i.e., increased tariffs) could be
transferred to injured industries and compensate them for
the loss of the export revenue. However, the compensation
cannot generate alternative export markets for the affected
industries or fully cover some of the loss caused by the
reduction in export, such as reduction in production and loss
of employment, which has long-term ramifications. The
retaliatory measures may benefit domestic producers
competing with the covered imports but will raise prices of
the imports for domestic consumers. In addition, the outcome
of the initial import restraints and retaliation would be
higher prices and reduced trade volumes, causing a net
economic loss.245
The delays and limitations in remedy (i.e., only
prospective remedy), as well as the adverse economic impact
of retaliation, demand a different approach. The delays in the
dispute settlement process require an improvement by
expediting the process and reducing the current case
backlog. To make this improvement, resources available to
the WTO, including the number of full-time lawyers to assist
the DSB, need to be expanded. Additional measures, such as
the appointment of full-time panelists, introduction of
intensive sessions for the panel and the Appellate Body

243. Yong-Shik Lee, Are Retaliatory Trade Measures Justified under the WTO
Agreement on Safeguards?, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 439 (2019).
244. See discussion supra Section III.C.
245. According to the study of welfare economics, the welfare loss to consumers
caused by trade restraints is greater than the welfare gain by domestic producers,
resulting in a net loss to the society. DOMINICK SALVATORE, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 221–28, 257–60 (11th ed. 2013).
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proceedings, and the expansion of the Appellate Body
membership, would be helpful to expedite the process.
However, it not clear whether the Members would be willing
to agree on the expansion of the resources. The failure to
conclude the Doha Round has weakened institutional
confidence in the WTO, and some Members are known to
have limited trust in the WTO dispute settlement process.246
Consideration should also be given to fix the prospective
remedy currently offered by the DSB. Remedies may include
the requirement of payment, including the return of payment
equivalent to the revenue generated by the increased tariffs
found inconsistent with WTO rules. The calculation of
payment will be more complex when a quota is involved. As
in the case of retaliation, compensation in the form of
payment may not be a full remedy for the affected exporting
industry, because it may not cover the loss of export markets
and employment. Despite these limits, the payment
requirement will discourage Members from adopting
measures inconsistent with WTO disciplines. Additional
measures, such as injunctive relief, which requires the
Member applying the disputed measure to suspend its
application in whole or in part pending the final outcome of
the dispute settlement process, could also be helpful to
prevent the escalation of the situation. The conditions
defining a threshold for such suspension, such as the number
of complainants and the size of trade to be affected by the
measure, will have to be determined.

246. See Tom Miles, Diplomats search for way to save trade system after U.S.
vetoes judges, REUTERS WORLD NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trade-wto/diplomats-search-for-way-to-save-trade-system-after-us-vetoes-judges-idUSKBN1DR2PR [https://perma.cc/E24K-XA3C].
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has examined developments in international
trade law and practice post neoliberalism. The failure to
conclude the Doha Round undermined institutional
confidence and credibility of the WTO, but most Members
agree that there is no replacement for the MTS under the
auspices of the WTO.247 The development deficits in WTO
disciplines, as a result of the neoliberal approaches (“onesize-fits-all”) adopted in the rule making process of the UR,
caused subsequent challenges from developing countries.248
Developing countries, through various coalitions and
alliances, prevented the expansion of the neoliberal agenda
(“the Singapore issues”) after the UR and renewed focus on
development through the DDA. The Doha Round did not
accomplish fundamental regulatory reform, such as the
reform of the subsidies regime as introduced in this Article.
However, even the limited reform agenda faced objections
from developed countries, demonstrating the substantial
gaps in positions on development issues between developed
and developing countries.
While the Doha Round stagnated, developed country
Members that could not advance their agenda through
multilateral negotiations turned to RTAs. The proliferation
of RTAs might be viewed as a natural development in
consideration of the size of the WTO membership (164
countries) and the vast differences among Members in their
capacities, interests, and priorities related to trade.
However, the proliferation of RTAs can lead to a
fragmentation of the trade disciplines and the
destabilization of the MTS.249 RTAs may increase the space
of free trade, but their exclusive nature erodes the MFN
principle, which is the core base of the MTS. Further, RTAs
247. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December, 2015,
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (2015).
248. See discussion supra Part I.
249. See discussion supra Part II.
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burden trading nations with dissimilar rules under multiple
RTAs, whose terms may be different from one another and
also from WTO rules. This complexity is not conducive to the
expansion of international trade. Developing countries may,
once again, be on the receiving end in RTA negotiations with
more powerful developed countries where they cannot form
effective coalitions and alliances.
Trade protectionism is another concerning development.
The recent U.S. trade policy—a shift toward protectionism
and unprecedented protective trade measures argued to be
necessary to safeguard U.S. trade interests and preserve
policy autonomy250—is an ironic response, considering that
the United States was the main architect of the post war
international trading system, including the GATT and the
WTO. It is a testament to the change that has taken place
since the 1990s, suggesting that the time for neoliberalism
has passed. Indeed, the neoliberalism embedded in WTO
disciplines does not even work for the most powerful economy
and the largest trader, regardless of the legitimacy of the
trade policy and trade measures adopted by the Trump
administration. The tariff hikes under the Trump
administration, both against China and the rest of the world
(the steel and aluminum tariffs) are unprecedented in scale.
The rationale for the tariffs—the protection of national
security—is similarly unprecedented. National security has
never been invoked to justify such massive trade measures
on a global scale, and its proliferation would endanger the
stability of the MTS. At the time of writing, the U.S.
Department of Commerce has completed another
investigation report concluding that trade measures are also
necessary to protect domestic automobile industries for
national security.251
250. See discussion supra Part III.
251. David Lawder & David Shepardson, U.S. agency submits auto tariff probe
report to White House, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-trade-autos/us-agency-submits-auto-tariff-probe-report-to-white-houseidUSKCN1Q706C [https://perma.cc/BL7B-7DQL].
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This Article has also examined possible regulatory
reforms to address the issues raised in the proceeding
discussion: the development deficits, the gaps in the trade
disciplines caused by the proliferation of RTAs, and the
problems caused by trade protectionism and retaliations.252
As to the development deficits, this Article has introduced
regulatory reforms that will instill flexibility in the tariff
schedules, such as the Development-Facilitating Tariff or
“DFT.” This Article has also suggested reforms that will
restore developing countries’ ability to adopt trade-related
subsidies for economic development, such as the
Development-Facilitating Subsidy or “DFS.” Further, it has
discussed the revision of anti-dumping measures, beyond the
limited reform that has been proposed in the Doha Round.253
On RTAs, the derogation from the MFN principle is
inherently incompatible with the MTS, weakening the latter.
This Article has examined regulatory reforms, such as the
proposed sunset policy, to close the gaps between the MTS
and RTAs.254 Lastly, the recent trade protectionism and the
unprecedented trade measures raise substantial concern for
the future of the MTS. Retaliatory responses are not a
sustainable solution, and consideration should be given to
more feasible ones, which include measures to expedite the
WTO dispute settlement process, augment the current
prospective remedies with payment requirements, and
provide injunctive relief. The suggested reforms will
reinforce the MTS in the changing international
socioeconomic environment post neoliberalism.

252. See discussion supra Part IV.
253. See Doha Declaration, supra note 79.
254. See discussion supra Part IV.

